How reliable is your AI agent?


… And how research can help

17.09.2026 | Agentic AI Night, AAIF, Luxembourg
Presented by Maxime Cordy and Karim Tit
Slides by Nour Boumediene, Karim Tit and Maxime Cordy


Images by flaticon.com or generated by ChatGPT-5.6 Sol Light

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The Hare and the Tortoise




Industry




Academia

THE LONG ROAD FROM IDEA TO IMPACT



FROM EARLY NEURONS TO TODAY'S AI

Nearly 70 years of research — then impact at global scale




Impact of fundamental research (in AI)



Dan Hendrycks, Center for AI Safety

PhD from UC Berkeley




Gaussian Error Linear Unit (2016)

The Hare and the Tortoise… and the Aircraft



Industry





Academia

Academic research is in crisis…

AI RESEARCH SCANDALS 2025–2026

ETHICS AND INTEGRITY CRISES ROCKING TOP AI CONFERENCES


NeurIPS · ICML · ICLR · CVPR · ACL · & more





1 HIDDEN PROMPTS IN PAPERS


Manipulating AI Reviewers



- Hidden instructions (white text, tiny fonts, etc.) aimed at LLM reviewers
- Discovered in multiple arXiv papers from top institutions
- Several papers withdrawn after public backlash

2 AI-GENERATED PEER REVIEWS

Outsourcing Scientific Judgment



- ~21% of ICLR reviews fully AI-generated (analysis)
- >50% showed signs of AI assistance
- Issues: misunderstandings, hallucinations, fake details, generic feedback
- ICLR introduced disclosure rules and new policies

3 HALLUCINATED CITATIONS

AI-Generated Content Without Verification



- Fake papers, authors, venues, and corrupted references
- Several withdrawn submissions with AI-generated artifacts
- Erodes trust in research quality and scholarship



4 AI "SLOP" FLOOD AT TOP VENUES

Quantity Over Quality



- Explosive growth in submissions driven by generative AI
- More incremental, low-quality, or duplicate work
- Review overload and declining review quality
- Sustainability of the peer review system at risk

5 REVIEWER DEANONYMIZATION & SECURITY ISSUES

Undermining Review Integrity



- OpenReview security incidents exposed reviewer identities
- Public comments, harassment, and attempts to link reviewers to papers
- Threatens reviewer safety and compromises honest feedback
- ICLR implemented security improvements and protections

6 AI-ENABLED PAPER MILLS

Industrial-Scale Scientific Fraud



- Fake papers produced for profit
- Fabricated experiments and manipulated peer review
- Fake reviewer accounts and identities
- LLMs make paper mills cheaper, faster, and harder to detect

7 UNDISCLOSED LLM USE IN AUTHORSHIP

Authorship & Attribution Crisis



- LLMs used for writing, code, literature review, rebuttals, and more
- Often undisclosed or downplayed
- Conferences now require disclosure of LLM contributions

THE BIGGER PICTURE

The integrity of AI research is under unprecedented pressure. As AI tools become faster and more powerful, the research community must strengthen ethics, transparency, and accountability.

FAIR REVIEW
Transparent, honest, and responsible peer review

VERIFY & FACT-CHECK
Rigorous verification of results, citations, and claims

DISCLOSE AI USE
Clear disclosure of LLM/tool assistance in writing and review

PROTECT REVIEWERS
Ensure anonymity, safety, and respect in the process

BUILD TRUST
Uphold the integrity and credibility of AI research

> *"AI will transform research. Integrity must guide it."*

Generated with chatGPT on 16 June 202

Generated with chatGPT on 16 June 2

AI INNOVATION IS OUTPACING ACADEMIA


INDUSTRY LEADS, ACADEMIC OUTPUTS LAG

Evidence from reports, studies and data (2024–2025)



1 INDUSTRY PRODUCES ALL FRONTIER MODELS

Stanford AI Index 2025: Industry produced 55 notable AI models in 2024. Academia produced none on its own.



Source: Stanford AI Index 2025

2 ACADEMIA LACKS THE COMPUTE TO COMPETE

Nature (2024): Universities cannot access the GPU clusters needed for state-of-the-art models. Frontier AI now requires infrastructure costing tens to hundreds of millions of dollars.



Source: Nature, 636, 8041 (2024)

3 TOP AI TALENT IS MIGRATING TO INDUSTRY


Economics studies of 150,000+ computer scientists show a large reallocation of AI talent toward major tech firms.

- Publications drop
- Patents rise
- Compensation rises

Sources: Arora et al. (2024), Cepr VOXEU (2025)

4 INDUSTRY-FUNDED RESEARCH HAS HIGHER IMPACT

Analysis of ~50,000 AI papers (2025): Industry-funded papers receive significantly more citations and attention and are increasingly dominant at top AI conferences.



Source: Zhu et al. (2025)

5 OPEN SCIENCE PAPERS: INDUSTRY DOMINATES THE 3 KEY INGREDIENTS

Frontiers in Research Metrics & Analytics (2025): Industry dominates computing power, large-scale datasets and highly skilled researchers.



Source: Lozano et al. (2025)

6 ACADEMIC PUBLICATION CYCLES ARE TOO SLOW

Research, writing, peer review and publication take many months. Industry releases multiple model generations in the same period.



Source: Multiple researchers' surveys & reports (2024–2025)

7 GROWING GAP BETWEEN ACADEMIC FOCUS & INDUSTRY FRONTIER

Academia often evaluates open models and benchmarks that lag behind proprietary frontier systems and real-world deployments.

ACADEMIA TYPICALLY WORKS ON	INDUSTRY PUSHES THE FRONTIER
• Open-source models	• Proprietary frontier models
• Previous-generation benchmarks	• Cutting-edge infrastructure
• Post-hoc analysis & evaluation	• Rapid iteration & deployment
• Slower iteration	• Solving real-world scale problems

Source: AI Alignment Forum (2025) and others

THE BOTTOM LINE

- Frontier model development is now concentrated in industry.
- Industry controls the key inputs: compute, data and top talent.
- Academic research cycles are slow; by the time papers are published, industry has moved ahead.
- Academia increasingly studies yesterday's models, while industry sets the pace.

Academia remains vital for theory, safety, interpretability and long-term understanding—but the frontier of AI innovation is now led by industry.

Consensus across independent evidence:
The center of gravity for frontier AI innovation has shifted to industry due to compute concentration, proprietary data, talent migration and faster iteration—making academic outputs more likely to be rapidly outdated.

Stanford AI Index 2025 hai.stanford.edu/ai-index
Nature, 636, 8041 (2024) doi:10.1038/d41586-024-03792-6
Arora et al. (2024) NBER w26106
Zhu et al. (2025) arXiv:2512.05714
Lozano et al. (2025) Front. Res. Metr. Anal.
AI Alignment Forum (2025) arXiv:2512.15148



Generated with chatGPT on 16 June 2
ARE WE BECOMING OBSOLETE?

More than a virtue… a renewed mission!

Academic research is in crisis…

…and this might be our best opportunity

Our Research Strategy for Trustworthy AI



Research areas \ Application domains	Financial Services	Official Statistics	Cybersecurity	Energy
Machine Learning Security	BGL BNP PARIBAS		Luxembourg House of Cybersecurity; CONATIX cysana	
AI x Software Engineering	European Stability Mechanism	STATEC	CONATIX cysana	
Knowledge-informed Machine Learning	European Stability Mechanism; BGL BNP PARIBAS			creos
Tabular Machine Learning	European Stability Mechanism; BGL BNP PARIBAS	STATEC		creos

How reliable is your AI agent?





FROM LANGUAGE MODELS TO OPERATIONAL AI CO-WORKERS




A NEW WAVE OF AI

Rapid industrial convergence toward AI operator systems





Date
Nov. 2025
Feb. 2026
Feb. 2026
March 2026
April 2026
May 2026



AI AGENTS GOING WRONG...

A tech executive is raising eyebrows after revealing that his AI assistant called him, unprompted, early one morning. Alex Finn, founder and CEO of Creator Buddy, an AI content platform, described the experience as “straight out of a sci-fi horror movie.”



An OpenClaw AI agent asked to delete a confidential email nuked its own mail client and called it fixed

Jonathan Kemper Feb 26, 2026

AI AGENTS GOING WRONG... IN ORGANISATIONS

Table 2. Copy-Paste and Business Process Task Distribution

Task Collection	Activity Type	Task Count	Examples
Copy-Paste Tasks	Data Aggregation & Collection	7	Contact details from tables, quarterly sales compilation, calendar meetings, medical lab results, appointment scheduling
	Filtering & Search	6	Product catalog browsing, urgent task compilation, inventory analysis, library catalog search, electronics filtering
	Content Analysis & Validation	6	Invoice analysis, spam detection, survey counting, resource conflicts, document diff review, accessibility audit
	External Reference & Form Processing	9	Customer registration wizard, service tickets, library cataloging, student enrollment, tenant application, loan application
	Classification & Rule-Based Processing	6	Product configuration validator, code review resolution, service taxonomy mapping, design annotation validation
	Data Manipulation	3	Salary updates, Kanban ticket management, social media scheduling
	Navigation & Exploration	3	File tree PDF collection, org chart traversal, menu hierarchy mapping
Business Process Tasks	Error Recovery & Batch Processing	2	Connection timeout handling, file access with error navigation
	Data Quality & Transformation	2	Currency normalization, customer deduplication
	Form Management & Data Entry	3	Accordion form completion, multi-step transport form, paginated table extraction
	Compliance & PII Management	1	Customer record anonymization
	Application Review	1	Graduate school application assessment
	Directory Analysis	1	Transport company fleet counting
Total		**50**	

Table 5. Average Performance Across All Resolutions

Model	Simple Tasks	Complex Tasks
Claude Computer Use 4.0	66.7%	9.5%
OpenAI-computer-use-preview	70.3%	10.5%
UIPathScreenAgent/Gemini 2.5 Flash	68.6%	11.9%
UIPathScreenAgent/GPT-5 mini	77.0%	18.4%
UIPathScreenAgent/GPT-5	84.8%	19.4%

Cristescu et al., UI-CUBE: Enterprise-Grade Computer Use Agent Benchmarking Beyond Task Accuracy to Operational Reliability, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.17131

RELIABILITY: What changes when AI can act?

Tool use gives model errors consequences outside the conversation

Advice	Action
“Send the payroll file to Alex.”	**The agent emails the file to the wrong Alex.**
A person can catch the recipient error before sending the file.	The agent’s permissions determine which data it can disclose.

Assess the output, executed tool calls and resulting state.

Errors can persist in memory or pass to other agents.

SECURITY: The agent's attack surface

Category	Description	Examples
Internal threats	Within the agents' trusted execution boundaries	Conversational manipulation (jailbreaking), memory poisoning
External threats	From the external environment and tools the agent interacts with	Prompt injection via external files (emails), UIs, web data, agent skills, third-party APIs, …
Misalignment threats	Own behaviour diverging	Corrupt success, looping, goal drift

Summary: Evaluating an Agent Workflow

The evaluation must include tool use and its consequences



Reliability

Did it send the right file to the intended Alex?

Security

Could **untrusted content** change the recipient?

Safety

Was the disclosure **allowed**, even if the task succeeded?

Task completion does not establish policy compliance.

… And how research can help

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How research can contribute

- Establish taxonomies and standards
- Understand and formulate real-world problems
- Survey the “state of the art”
- Collect, build and execute benchmarks
- Identify scientific/fundamental gaps
- Design and validate solutions
- Make it go wrong… and fix it

How reliable is your AI agent?

Introduction

Corrupt success

Constraint enforcement



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Would you deploy without human review?

Audience vote: a hypothetical release decision

The proposed release

An agent reports a fix for a checkout bug.
The tests pass and rollback is available.

A Deploy automatically
Accept the passing tests as sufficient.

B Require human review
Inspect the patch before deployment.

C Require protected tests
Run tests the agent cannot edit.

CI report: all tests pass

Patch diff

Not yet inspected

What evidence supports the test result?

Choose A, B or C. What would change your decision?

Would you deploy without human review?

Audience vote: the patch diff is now available

The proposed release

An agent reports a fix for a checkout bug.
The tests pass and rollback is available.

A Deploy automatically
Accept the passing tests as sufficient.

B Require human review
Inspect the patch before deployment.

C Require protected tests
Run tests the agent cannot edit.

CI report: all tests pass

Application code: unchanged

```
- assert total == expected
+ assert total >= 0
```

The assertion was weakened.

The test no longer checks the total.

Would you change your decision after seeing this diff?

Why and when do agents cheat to win?

Reward hacking in controlled evaluations

In the quiz, the agent changed the test without fixing the bug.

Corrupt success: meeting the measured goal while violating a task constraint.

Observed behaviour

METR observed agents editing timing or evaluation code to inflate their scores.


Implications for evaluation

Protect tests and scoring from agent edits, and inspect the submitted changes.

METR, Recent Frontier Models Are Reward Hacking, 5 June 2025

Auditing an agent workflow


Compare normal and attacked runs under the same policy



Repeat the evaluation when the model, prompts, tools or policy change.

AgentDojo

Testing safe and valid task completion and resistance to prompt injection




97 tasks and 629 security cases in the original release

Debenedetti et al. • NeurIPS 2024 • Figure 1


Paper GitHub

DTap: DecodingTrust-Agent Platform

Simulated environments for testing attacks and defenses on agents



Simulated spreadsheet environment



14 domains
50+ environments

DTap-Red

Searches for attacks through prompts, tools, skills and the environment.

DTap-Bench

Pairs attacks with judges that assess their outcomes.

Chen et al. (2026) • Environment example

Paper GitHub

Demo: corrupt success in a spreadsheet

Effect of an external policy check

User task: clean Budget only and report Q1/Q2 totals




Would you allow this automation?

Demo: corrupt success in a spreadsheet

Effect of an external policy check

User task: summarise a public issue




-> Add a policy check before executing each tool call.

Demo: corrupt success in a spreadsheet

Effect of an external policy check

User task: summarise a public issue



Same task completed but Unauthorized effects prevented.

How reliable is your AI agent?

Corrupt success

Constraint enforcement

Multi-agent systems




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Review, verification and constrained decoding

Checks after generation and constraints during generation

- Check each handoff in an agent workflow.
- **Human review:** inspect the output and request changes.
- **Verifier-in-the-loop:** check the output and retry if it violates a constraint.
- **Constrained decoding:** exclude continuations that violate the encoded constraints.



Syntax and authorisation

A valid tool call may still violate the policy

Policy: payroll files must remain inside the organisation.

```
{
  "tool": "send_email",
  "to": "outside@example.org",
  "attachment": "payroll.csv"
}
```

Schema check: passes

Fields and types are valid

Policy check: fails

The recipient is external.

ValidSchema(a) ⇏ Authorised(s, a)

Grammar constraints enforce the specified language, which may omit policy requirements.

Constraining the next tool call

Example policy: test and approve the version before deployment

Trusted state
Tests and approval pending

CI and the approval service provide the state.
The agent cannot approve its own release.

Next tool call

```
Generating: {"tool": ▌}
```

run_tests(version)
request_approval(version) • stop()

deploy(version) is excluded

A state-dependent grammar masks forbidden tool names and arguments.

Recheck authorisation before execution; stop or escalate if no action is permitted.

Our lab: ABS • Paper

Constraining the next tool call

Example policy: test and approve the version before deployment

Trusted state
Tests passed and approval recorded

CI and the approval service provide the state.
The agent cannot approve its own release.

Next tool call

```
Generating: {"tool": ▌}
```

deploy(version)
stop()

Approval applies only to this version.

A state-dependent grammar masks forbidden tool names and arguments.


Recheck authorisation before execution; stop or escalate if no action is permitted.

Our lab: ABS • Paper

Automaton construction from temporal logic

((¬cat U coffee) ∧ F cat) ∧ ((¬toy U cat) ∧ F toy) ∧ ((¬eos U toy) ∧ F eos)

.*coffee.*cat.*toy.*eos.*



State	coffee	cat	toy	eos
q_0	q_2	q_1	q_1	q_1
q_1	q_1	q_1	q_1	q_1
q_2	q_2	q_3	q_1	q_1
q_3	q_3	q_3	q_4	q_1
q_4	q_4	q_4	q_4	q_5
q_5	q_1	q_1	q_1	q_1

Distances to closest accepting state:

$$d(q_0) = 4 \quad d(q_1) = +\infty \quad d(q_2) = 3$$
$$d(q_3) = 2 \quad d(q_4) = 2 \quad d(q_5) = 0$$

Graph correction: $d(q_4) = 1$

Generate a sentence that contains coffee, cat, and toy in that order:


$\alpha = 0.25$

$\alpha = 0.25$

$t = 0$

Number of beams = 2

T = 9




Local and global constrained decoding

Local optimisation

Input: LLM, prompt x, completion engine CE_L for language L
Output: Program s such that $s \in L$

```
initialize s
while true do
    v := LLM(x ∘ s)
    while true do
        t ~ v
        if CE_L(s ∘ t) then break
        elif t = EOS and s ∈ L then break
        else v[t] := 0; normalize v
    if t = EOS then break
    s := s ∘ t
return s
```


Global optimisation



- **Local:** silhouette of suspected ... an heavily secured.in the park
- **Global:** A man and a woman are walking in the park

Constrained decoding under a token budget

Completing a feasible prefix may require more tokens than remain



Prefix feasibility

Can this prefix still be completed?

Completion within budget

Can it be completed within budget?
Use the distance to an accepting state.

SWYB: distance-guided decoding for context-free grammars

SWYB • Paper (ours) GitHub

Meme template: Imgflip

Enforcing semantic constraints

The specification determines which properties can be guaranteed

Properties we can encode

Types and variable scope
Specified action order
State invariants in a formal model

Open problems

Specifying the user's intent
Finding valid prefix completions
Modelling a changing environment



The guarantee assumes a correct specification, model and checker.

Research on semantic constraints:


Synchromesh Type-constrained generation ChopChop GenLM-Control

Let’s work <u>together</u>! 


Tell us about your challenges



Experiment ideas with us



Try out our research tools



Contact: **maxime.cordy@uni.lu**
karim.tit@uni.lu

References

Our lab

ABS - Collura, Tit et al. (2025)

Automata-guided beam search

Paper

SWYB - Collura, Tit et al. (2026)

Stay Within Your Bounds • Findings of EMNLP 2026

Paper GitHub

Evaluation and auditing

AgentDojo - Debenedetti et al. (2024)

Prompt-injection attacks and defences

Paper GitHub

DTap - Chen et al. (2026)

DecodingTrust-Agent Platform

Paper GitHub

Semantic constraints

Synchromesh - Poesia et al. (2022)

Paper

Type-Constrained Code Generation - Mündler et al. (2025)

Paper GitHub

ChopChop - Nagy et al. (2025)

Paper GitHub

Agent failures and attacks

Prompt Infection - Lee & Tiwari (2024)

Paper

Recent Frontier Models Are Reward Hacking

METR (2025)

Report